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OF HARMS AND BENEFITS: TORTS, 
RESTITUTION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
WENDY J. GORDON* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
COPYRIGHT and patent take the form of ordinary property. As tangible 
property has physical edges, intellectual property statutes create bound-
aries by defining the subject matters within their zone of protection. As 
real property owners have rights to prevent strangers from entering their 
land, intellectual property statutes and case law grant owners rights to 
exclude strangers from using the protected work in specified ways. As 
tangible property can be bought and sold, bequeathed and inherited, so 
can copyrights and patents. 1 
But does this similarity of form mask an inconsistency of function? 
Justifications for tangible property typically refer to the internalization of 
both positive and negative effects, but justifications for intellectual prop-
erty tend to be more one-sided. Legal protection for intellectual products 
is based on the benefits the producers generate: from a fairness point of 
view it is argued that persons who create works of value deserve to be 
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paid for the benefits generated,2 and from an economic point of view it 
is argued that desirable incentives are provided by allowing creators to 
capture (internalize) some share of the benefits they create. 3 Because 
intellectual products can be infinitely replicated without necessarily de-
priving their creator of possession, their economic key is the provision 
of positive rather than negative incentives: copying is not in itself some-
thing to discourage, any more than additional use of a classic noncon-
gested public good such as national defense should be discouraged. Un-
compensated use of an inexhaustible good is worth discouraging only as 
a means to an end: obtaining adequate incentives for the good's initial 
production and maintenance. 
Yet the traditional patterns of judge-made law much more easily pro-
vide negative incentives than positive incentives. Duties to guard against 
harm are far more common than duties to provide or pay for benefits. 
Tort law flourishes, while restitution law remains a virtual backwater4-
an area where benefits rendered by mistake, or as the result of a failed 
contract, or in an emergency can sometimes be sued on. 
I have briefly argued elsewhere that the core of intellectual property-a 
grant of rights over benefits-is consistent with the common law's pattern 
of entitlements. 5 But, given the dissimilarity with which judges have 
treated harms and benefits, negative and positive incentives, is that 
correct? 
2 The fairness argument works better for copyright than for patent. In copyright, only 
copying-the use of a beneficial work originating with another-is actionable, while, in 
patent, even an independent and coincidental replication of a patented invention is action-
able by the patent holder. 
3 The incentives for the creation of new work provided by an intellectual-property system 
must be weighed against the deadweight loss and administrative costs of the system; the 
economic goal is to obtain the highest net sum. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326 (1989). How to achieve 
that precise balance is outside the scope of this article. 
4 Note, however, that some instances of restitution may be invisible because of an overlap 
with tort or contract. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 
Tex. L. Rev. 1277, 1283 (1989). In addition, the provision of positive incentives in traditional 
law may be partially masked by a survey of case law; tangible property works to internalize 
both positive and negative effects, and the basic allocation of tangible property has not 
been primarily a judicial matter. 
5 See Gordon, supra note I, at 1446-59 (exploring competing baselines and concluding 
that a noncontractual entitlement to be paid for what one's labor produces is consistent with 
a basic pattern in restitution doctrine). See also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: 
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149 (1992) (examining 
corrective justice and restitution and concluding that both support an entitlement to be paid 
for one's labor, though the resulting entitlement is weak, conditional, and limited). Note 
that I will use "common law" to mean judge-made law; unless the context suggests other-
wise, the usage will thus embrace cases decided both at common law and equity. 
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Some of the differential treatment of benefits might be explained as due 
to the judiciary's consciousness of its own institutional limitations6-an 
approach that could render many of the common-law denials of recovery 
irrelevant to statutory intellectual property. In fact, I have elsewhere 
suggested that the legislature seems better suited than the courts to craft 
rights over benefit generation.7 Nevertheless, the common-law pattern 
may suggest that encouraging the generation of benefit may pose special 
difficulties that go beyond the questions of institutional competence. Ac-
cordingly, this article puts aside the issue of comparative institutional 
competence to examine whether the judicial doctrines evidence substan-
tive choices that should caution against even legislative pursuit of benefit 
production in the intellectual property area. 
From an abstract perspective, there would seem to be little reason 
for harms and benefits to be treated differently. Decades of cost-benefit 
analyses suggest that the two categories are interchangeable: reducing by 
one dollar damage that would otherwise occur is equivalent to providing 
a dollar's worth of new goods or services. The labels are themselves 
variable. One can verbally transform most benefit questions into 
''harms'' and vice versa by juggling the baseline from which effects are 
measured. For example, this article defines harms and benefits using the 
status quo as a baseline, and, under that definition, benefits are obviously 
key to intellectual-product regulation: intellectual-product producers may 
lack any markets capable of being "harmed" unless they are first guaran-
teed some form of legal protection for the benefits their works generate. 
Yet one might instead argue that the proper baseline for copyright is the 
exclusive right over copying that it gives authors; under such a definition 
even copying that does not interfere with an authors' markets could count 
as a "harm," and, by verbal legerdemain, benefits would be cast out of 
the picture. 8 
6 Providing rewards for benefits can pose dangers to competition that a court-with its 
two-party focus and limited sources of information-may be ill equipped to assess. See, 
for example, Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 ("[W]e are not in any 
position to pass upon the questions involved"; "records prepared by litigants ... cannot 
disclose the conditions of this industry, or of the others which may be involved"). 
7 See Gordon, supra note 5, at, for example, 151 n.4, 259 n.419, 272, and 281 (suggesting 
that legislators are better able than courts to provide the advance specification of boundaries 
that is crucial to a socially beneficial system of intellectual property). 
8 Note that the change of label does not change the underlying issue: the economic reason 
for granting an author an entitlement capable of being "harmed" has to do in the first 
instance with the increase in value to which she is in a position to contribute. This article 
uses the status quo as its baseline of comparison: if the act or omission that is the purported 
premise for liability adds value from what would otherwise be present, that addition is a 
benefit; if it subtracts, that is a harm. 
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Yet, for all their malleability, the two terms are not interchangeable. 
Once a stable baseline is chosen, the terms "harm" and "benefit" will 
indicate different phenomena. Notably, the common law usually employs 
the status quo as the baseline from which harm and benefit are measured. 
Adding to what already exists is different from taking from it, and it is 
plausible that each would entail different functional considerations that 
the makers of intellectual-product law would be unwise to ignore. For 
example, common-law cases might reveal that transaction costs are much 
more expensive or liability rules more strained when the issue is giving 
positive rather than negative incentives. Or, if the judges reveal a disincli-
nation to order payment for benefit and that disinclination is not explain-
able in functional terms, that might lead to a useful reevaluation of the 
normative proposition that creators deserve some reward for their effort. 
This article examines the reasons for the apparent disinclination of 
judges sitting in common law and equity to order recovery for benefit 
generation. It concludes that these reasons do not condemn a benefit-
based grant of rights in intellectual products. 
II. TORTS AND RESTITUTION 
A. The Asymmetry Critique 
Some observers believe that the common law has treated the internal-
ization of harms quite differently from the way it has treated the internal-
ization of benefits. If Harriet erects a reeking cattle feedlot next to Peter's 
residential neighborhood, for example, Peter will probably be able to 
obtain damages or an injunction against her, in nuisance. If, by contrast, 
Harriet builds a luxury resort hotel next to Peter's land, absent contract 
she will have no legal right to obtain monies from him, no matter how 
high his land values rise as a result of her development. 9 For injuring her 
neighbor, Harriet must pay. But for benefiting him, she cannot use the 
law to demand compensation he has not agreed to pay. As Saul Lev more 
has observed, "The law appears ready to create missing bargains in tort 
where harms are concerned, but is reluctant to do so in restitution where 
benefits are at stake." 10 
If the common law is more willing to internalize harms than it is to 
recapture benefits, then its purported preference for internalization be-
9 See Restatement of Restitution § I at 9, illustration (c) (1937). 
to Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L. Rev. 65, 72 (1985). 
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comes a shaky precedent for intellectual property, particularly for the 
modern statutory pattern that gives authors and inventors rights that go 
beyond protection from being harmed in existing markets. 11 If indeed 
there is a "basic asymmetry" 12 between the way the law treats harms 
and the way it treats benefits, then intellectual property's place in our 
overall jurisprudence is potentially precarious. 
What follows is an argument that whatever asymmetry exists is attrib-
utable not to any per se difference between harm and benefit but, rather, 
to discrete problems that are likely to be absent when payment is sought 
for the use of an intellectual product. 
B. On the Absence of a Duty to Bene.fit Others 
Consider first an asymmetry in tort law itself. Negligence law imposes 
duties to avoid unreasonable behavior that could cause strangers harm, 
yet, under the no-duty-to-aid rule, it generally declines to impose duties 
to create benefits for strangers. 13 Why does the law not impose liability 
for a failure to generate benefit as it does for a failure to take precautions 
against harm? There are two primary reasons, and they have to do with 
the appropriate choice of tools (sticks versus carrots) and do not reflect 
any lack of concern with encouraging benefit-producing behavior. 
The first reason is a concern with liberty. Liability for failure to gener-
ate benefits for those with whom one has no prior relationship, like liabil-
ity for failure to act to assist such persons, would be potentially all perva-
sive, for one can always do more for those who suffer. Liability schemes 
premised on harms are significantly more limited in nature, for there is 
much one can do without harming other people. Therefore, liability for 
11 In the early years of the nation, the copyright statute was quite harm oriented: it 
protected authors against little more than virtually verbatim reproduction. That was progres-
sively altered. In 1870, authors were given rights over dramatizations and translations of 
their works; later an abridgement right was added. Today authors have "exclusive rights" 
to prepare and authorize derivative works (17 U.S.C. 106) not conditional on their having 
entered the derivative work market. See Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750 (1990) (authors 
free to suppress their work without impairing their copyright) (dicta). Yet traces of the old 
approach remain, particularly in the fair use doctrine (17 U .S.C. 107) where absence of 
economic harm will assist a defendant who seeks to escape liability. 
12 Levmore, supra note 10, at 72. Levmore does not claim that the difference between 
harm and benefit per se is responsible for the differing case results. Although I will dispute 
the way he has articulated his asymmetry observation (see Section IIIB infra), this article 
builds on, rather than repudiates, Levmore's analysis. 
13 Note that a duty to aid or to create benefits is distinct from a duty to allow a stranger 
to share one's existing resources. For example, in Ploofv. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 
(1908). a landowner was held liable for his servant's cutting the plaintiff's boat loose when 
it docked without permission in a storm; yet, had the boat worked itself loose, a passing 
stranger would not have been liable for refusing to assist the plaintiff. 
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failure to generate benefits would pose a greater danger to defendants' 
liberty than would liability for harm. 14 
The second reason is a concern with practicability. It can be hard to 
determine particular duties and the individuals on whom the duty should 
appropriately fall. 15 There are a large number of turning points leading to 
any event, and a large number of persons whose actions could have 
averted any given harm. What is the baseline from which any one bad 
samaritan's shortfall should be measured? It is hard to imagine how his 
liability might be computed. 
Each of these reasons are at work in the area of intellectual products. 
Imposition of a legal duty to create would have a high cost in terms of 
liberty. Further, a liability approach16 to force the creation of new works 
would likely be wholly impracticable-it is hard to imagine how the law 
could determine which persons should be penalized for failing to create 
what new things 17 or how to measure the benefits that a laggard author 
has failed to create. The law's unwillingness to impose a duty to produce 
benefits on potential creators thus does not indicate any lack of concern 
with generating incentives to encourage helpful activity or the production 
of valuable things. Rather, the principle that it is desirable to induce 
benefits is honored by other means, primarily by encouraging the forma-
tion of markets where payments for benefits will be forthcoming. 18 Giving 
creators a right to payment rather than a duty to create can generate 
incentives 19 without the liberty, practicability, and transaction cost prob-
lems just sketched. 
14 See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973). 
15 The difficulty of identifying a salient defendant is recognized as one reason for the 
no-duty-to-aid rule. Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and 
Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 Va. L. Rev. 879, 933-39 
(1986) (also suggesting that, in the future, the need to find an individually salient defendant 
may have a decreasing importance for no-duty-to-aid jurisprudence). 
16 For a more general discussion, see Gordon, supra note I, at 1407-13 (discussion of 
"mandatory sharing" and other hypothetical liability models for intellectual products). 
17 Even if lazy authors could be distinguished from ones with incurable writer's block, 
the very imposition of liability on proven authors could, in the long term, discourage new 
entrants into the field. Compare William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, 
Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. 
Legal Stud. 83 (1976) (a duty to aid might discourage potential rescuers from going to 
locations where rescues are likely to be needed). 
18 Intellectual property is, of course, one way of honoring this principle. Wendy J. Gor-
don, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case 
and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1605-14 (1982) (using the market model to 
explain copyright). 
19 Note, however, that a principle of internalization is neither self-explanatory nor abso-
lute, even if one restricts one's attention solely to economics. For example, copyright does 
not seek to internalize all benefits to an initial author; rather, it gives her a tool with which 
to demand a contract price from users, and each party will negotiate to receive benefits 
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C. Restitution as an Incentive for Harm Avoidance 
The second question to be faced in evaluating the charge of asymmetry 
is, Why is restitution not substituted for tort law as a general matter? 
Instead of punishing harm causers to discourage overly risky behavior, 
the law could, instead, hold out rewards for harm avoidance. 20 Resti-
tutionary rules could allow potential injurers who install special brakes 
on their cars, put filters on their factory smokestacks, or otherwise in-
cur trouble and expense to obtain recompense from all the persons who 
are thereby spared injury. 
If a safe driver could obtain payment from pedestrians for the reduction 
in risk they experience, for example, then drivers' hopes of collecting 
restitutionary payments might be an effective incentive to take precau-
tions. It might even be as effective as the desire to avoid a liability judg-
ment under conventional tort law21 and, in any event, could be a useful 
supplement to tort incentives. Further, that way the pedestrians would 
pay for what they get. 22 Why is this not the pattern that the law generally 
takes? 
One reason is that restitutionary rights based on harms averted would 
be harder to implement than are tort rights based on harms caused. It is 
easier for a court to identify from a limited number of involved parties 
one who should be held liable for "causing" a cost23 than it is to identify 
from the work. Even when contracts are not possible, it is usually preferable to encourage 
a creative user by allowing him to keep part of what he earns rather than stripping him to 
internalize all proceeds to a predecessor whose work he has copied. See generally Gordon, 
supra note 5, at section IIIC (remedies). 
20 This would give desirable incentives and also work toward spreading: the costs of 
paying to avoid risk would be borne by all those benefited. 
21 Persons who now drive carelessly can hope to be lucky enough to avoid an accident. 
But, on the one hand, if a driver could practicably sue for payment when careful, every act 
of carelessness would be costly in terms of receipts forgone. See R.H. Coase, The Problem 
of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). On the other hand, people may not respond to 
opportunity costs in the same way they do to out-of-pocket payments, risk aversion might 
give a psychological boost to the tort incentive system, and transaction costs might be likely 
to block suits seeking payment for benefits since the benefits are likely to be fairly small in 
individual amount and the defendants are likely to be very large in number. 
22 Although it may be economically desirable to force the "cheapest cost avoider" to 
take precautions, it is less clear why such a person should not be paid for doing so. It is 
true that some actors deserve neither Paretian deference nor compensation; a thief who is 
forced to give up his spoils, for example, would seem to have little ground for complaint. See 
Jules Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic 
Approach to Law, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 221 (1980). But a person who takes action to reduce 
harm does not seem an obvious candidate for Kaldor-Hicks treatment. 
23 Investigating who was factually linked to a particular accident can yield a short list of 
persons from which one or more can be chosen, via rough guess or other methods, as the 
person on whom liability should be placed to avoid such accidents in the future. See Guido 
Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 140-43 (1970). 
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from among the uninvolved public at large who should be paid to avert 
a potential cost. It is also easier to make one party pay than to make a 
large group pay. 24 
Additionally, work in the economics of transaction costs has suggested 
that rewards and subsidies-not liabilities and taxes-are the most effi-
cient methods of encouraging the production of benefits. 25 As Donald 
Wittman argues, in regard to risk creation, people behave reasonably 
more often than not. It is expensive to reward everyone for behavior they 
ordinarily should and ordinarily would engage in. Requiring those who 
benefit to pay for all such reasonable acts would make necessary a great 
many more court cases than would an opposite rule that merely requires 
the unreasonable actor to pay. 26 In addition, it is hard to decide what 
should be the relevant baseline from which this reward should be com-
puted. 27 
Further, requiring potential victims to pay for any precaution taken 
on their behalf and allowing potential injurers to collect monies for any 
precaution they care to take would create a species of forced purchases. 
People cannot afford to buy everything they might like to have,28 includ-
ing protection from harm. Being forced to pay for something one would 
not have purchased is a harm, even if one is required to pay no more 
than fair market value for it. 29 And if the good doer is a volunteer, the 
24 Even if appropriate candidates for suit could be identified, transaction costs could 
discourage resort to this remedy. Each defendant might proffer particularized reasons why 
he should not have to pay, based on his physical position at the moment the precaution 
was taken, which could require an expensive degree of individualized adjudication. 
25 Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit? 13 J. Legal Stud. 57, 
61, 62-64, 71-72 (1984) (suggesting that a liability or "stick" approach is the best way to 
treat the generation of negative externalities (harms) and that the restitutionary or "carrot" 
approach tends to be preferable for dealing with the generation of positive externalities 
(benefits)). See also Levmore, supra note 15, at 879, 933-39 (examining the mix of carrots 
and sticks in the duty-to-aid branch of tort law). 
26 Wittman, supra note 25, at 62-64. 
17 Wittman usefully notes that requiring potential victims to pay for harm not inflicted 
would involve measurement problems and consequent information costs far in excess of 
those involved where injurers must pay. Id. at 62-65. If potential victims must compensate 
an injurer for efficient behavior, he argues, there may be no way to decide what level of 
inefficient behavior to measure from; the law would be "trying to measure with a yardstick 
that is hard to see at one end." Id. at 64. 
18 See Levmore, supra note 10. 
29 See Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution 109-11 (1985) ("Market 
value is not [the recipient's] value"); see also Levmore, supra note 8. It might be argued 
that this is not a significant problem because one can always sell the unrequested item. 
Selling the item, however, will involve transaction costs; in doing so, an individual lacks 
the market avenues and reputation with the public that an established dealer can rely on 
and, thus, may have to sell the item for less than fair market price; and the benefit is often 
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question will always remain (given the real-world inadequacy of fact find-
ing) whether the unrequested action was indeed beneficial. 30 
In addition, this hypothetical restitutionary equivalent of tort law, 
whether conceived of as a substitute for tort law or as a supplement to 
it, would be inconsistent with the underlying entitlement patterns of the 
common law. Unreasonably causing people harm is usually considered 
wrongful. 31 Allowing potential harm causers to extract payment merely 
for behaving like reasonable people is normatively offensive. Some phi-
losophers have suggested that one should not be entitled to claim a right 
of payment for doing those things that one is morally obligated to do. 32 
Perhaps most important, paying people to refrain from doing harm is 
likely to encourage precisely the wrong sorts of behavior. Otherwise 
moral people might (inaccurately) infer that one has no moral obligation 
to do the right thing unless one is paid. 33 Immoral people, on the other 
hand, might (accurately) infer that they can benefit financially by threat-
ening harm to others. The possibility that the rule might erode conven-
tional moral strictures and, in so doing, decrease the amount of voluntary 
good doing in the world34 is troubling. Even more troubling is the likely 
effect on people who do not even attempt to comply with moral strictures. 
A right to payment for harm avoidance would give an incentive for 
extortion. 35 The vicious or greedy might threaten harm in the hope of 
inextricably tied to something the recipient does not wish to sell, like an unsolicited paint 
job on one's house. Besides, if the item were easily salable, the "donor" would probably 
have found it cheaper to sell than to litigate. 
30 This very doubt is part of the reason why the term "do-gooder" has a somewhat 
negative connotation in ordinary parlance. 
31 See the discussion of the common-law duties to refrain from doing harm in Gordon, 
supra note I, at 1361-65. 
32 See, for example, Lawrence C. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations 
41-42 (1977). Compare the doctrine in unjust enrichment law that no restitution is due for 
fulfilling a preexisting duty. Restatement of Restitution, supra note 7, at§ 60 (no restitution 
for fulfilling a legally enforceable duty); see also id. at § 61 (effect of moral duty on resti-
tution). 
33 Something the law permits may gradually come to be regarded as morally permissible 
as well: for example, divorce. Similarly, something the Jaw rewards may gradually come to 
be regarded as something that only needs to be done when one is paid. Tracing cause and 
effect in such cases is difficult. 
34 It is also possible that the availability of payment might take the "fun" out of doing 
good. Landes & Posner, supra note 17, have suggested that it would be difficult to feel 
altruistic and noble if good deeds always created a legal right to payment-and that payment 
might therefore discourage the doing of good deeds. 
35 For further treatment of how the potential for extortion bears on the appropriate alloca-
tion of property rights, see Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? J. 
Legal Stud. 13 (1972). See also, for example, Levmore, supra note 15, at 886-89 (discussing 
the "moral hazard" that might result if rescuers were legally entitled to receive rewards). 
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being paid to restrain themselves. Not only would that inappropriately 
redirect income from productive persons to successful extortionists and 
encourage wasteful expenditures,36 but it could also invite violence. To 
make credible a claim that one is capable of imposing harm, one may 
need occasionally to demonstrate one's capacity to injure. 37 
These reasons-and not a disinclination to encourage or reward benefit 
production-account for the law's usual refusal to order recipients to pay 
for others' efforts to protect them from harm. The few instances where 
the law has chosen a different course tend to prove that these are the 
reasons for the general no-recovery rule. 
Consider the famous case of Spur v. Del Webb. 38 An injunction in favor 
of someone benefiting from the cessation of a nuisance was conditioned 
on the beneficiary's reimbursing the operator of the harmful enterprise 
(a naturally odiferous and insect-drawing cattle feedlot) for the costs of 
relocation or shutting down. That is, the owner of the feedlot was paid 
to eliminate his own harm-causing activity. 39 The party required to pay 
was a developer who had deliberately located a senior citizen residential 
development within scent of the previously isolated feedlot. 
This case suggests that granting a restitutionary right of payment for 
harm avoidance may be appropriate in cases free of the dangers we have 
just canvassed. First, the absence of an extortionate motive on the part 
of the defendant was clear: the feedlot owner had not built his lot to force 
36 See R.H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 Va. L. Rev. 655, 672-74 
(1988) (blackmail involves wasteful expenditures). 
37 Wittman is curiously unconcerned about the possibility of extortion, perhaps because 
he has focused on conflicts between legitimate resource uses, such as ranching and farming, 
factories and homes. Although there are some hints that he may be concerned with giving 
improper incentives toward extortion, his examples in this regard seem oddly far off the 
mark. See. for example, Wittman, supra note 25, at 65 n.25 ("If we reward everyone for 
not robbing $3 million, then there are high transactions costs; if we reward only armored 
car guards, then there are improper incentives to become an armored car guard"). Perhaps 
his examples and his refusal to discuss the extortion issue directly, were intended tongue 
in cheek; however, the short shrift which Wittman gives to "justice" considerations in the 
land use context (see id. at 65 and n.26) suggests he may mean this approach seriously. 
38 Spur Industries, Inc., v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 
(1972). 
39 The court in Spur recharacterized the source of the damage: rather than focusing on 
the fact that the smells "cause" damage to the homeowners in the physical world, the court 
notes that the developer's enforcing an injunction would "cause" damage to the feedlot 
owner. Id. at 186. This characterization provides an illuminating perspective on the much-
bedeviled question of what should constitute "causing harm" in tort law. Although the 
court seems to be liberating '"causing harm" from usual notions of physical sequence 
(compare Epstein, supra note 14), it does not seem to view "cause" as a concept that can 
flow equally easily in any direction. For this court, assignment of "cause" seems to be 
linked with the moral or entitlement status of the parties' actions. 
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developers to pay him to shut down. Second, it was a person with the 
moral advantage who was required to cease his activities. The location 
of the residential development was unexpected in light of the prior path 
of the city's development,40 so the defendant had not acted improperly 
in locating his business. As for the developer, he had deliberately created 
a conflict between his customers' needs and Spur's-"tak[ing] advantage 
of the lesser land values"41 and then suing to remove one of the reasons 
for the land's low price. Thus, though the feedlot was the source of 
the physical harm (noxious smells), its owner had a position of moral 
superiority to the developer. Third, the court's unusual remedial struc-
ture provided a cure for the valuation problem. If the developer had 
any doubts that the reduction in noxious smells was "worth it" to him, 
he was not required to pay; he could choose not to enforce the injunc-
tion. Thus the extortion, morality, and valuation problems were absent-
and the court did not apply the usual rule of no-payment-for-harm-
avoidance. 42 
One sees the same pattern operating in more mundane areas. Bottle-
deposit laws amount to paying people for not littering and, therefore, 
appear to be an exception to the rule that people have no legal right to 
be paid for harm avoidance. Yet a law that requires grocers to pay people 
for bringing back empties is different from a general rule that would allow 
people to claim payment for not littering, and the differences lie in the 
areas already identified: incentives for extortion, administrability, effects 
on morality, and potential for harm. 
There is no potential for extortion: one's ability to litter is limited 
by one's willingness to spend money to purchase bottled drinks. Such 
schemes also lack the administrative problems that a general payment-
for-harm-reduction rule would involve. The baseline is clear, and there 
is no problem with duplicative efforts; an empty can be brought back 
only once. 
Further, since one can collect only for bottles that have been previ-
ously purchased, the bottle-deposit laws have minimal, if any, erosive 
effect on the legitimacy of demanding proper behavior as a matter of 
40 The court noted that, ordinarily, the developer's suit would have been defeated by the 
coming-to-the-nuisance doctrine but that, since many parties other than the developer would 
be harmed by the noxious odors (notably, the residents of the new homes), an injunction 
against the feedlot would be conditionally granted. 
41 Spur, 494 P.2d 708. As the court notes, the developer had "brought people to the 
nuisance to the forseeable detriment of Spur." See Spur. supra note 38. 
42 For an alternative explanation of Spur, see Donald Wittman, First Come, First Served: 
An Economic Analysis of "Coming to the Nuisance," 9 J. Legal Stud. 557, 566 (1980). 
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right.43 Were the law to reward all nonlittering, by contrast, children 
might insist that their parents pay them for picking up after themselves 
on the ground that "the government pays you for not littering, so on the 
same principle you should pay me. " 44 As for the possibility that the 
required payment will exceed the value of the benefit to the recipient and 
thus cause harm, the bottle-deposit laws circumvent this difficulty by 
making the potential litterer provide most of the funds. 45 
In short, there are many reasons why the law generally refuses to 
order people to pay when others reduce their risky or harmful activities: 
administrative difficulties, normative inconsistencies, incentives for ex-
tortion, and doubts about the value to the recipient of the purported risk 
reduction relative to the price. When these dangers are absent, the rule 
barring recovery for harm avoidance tends not to apply. 
Much of the intellectual-property area is free of the dangers that cau-
tion against awarding restitution. First, the extortion dangers are absent. 
Many normative views converge in suggesting that there is no extortion 
in giving creators a right to be paid for the benefits they give others,46 
and the effects of such a right are far different from those of extortion: 
such a right shifts income in ways that increase rather than decrease 
productivity. Second, administrability problems are lessened. It is not 
difficult to identify who is best able to render a benefit when that benefit 
is a creative work that the defendant is already utilizing:47 the creator of 
the benefit has already identified herself by making the work. Further, 
the parties benefited are not the whole world or some unidentifiable 
group. The infringer is fairly readily identified.48 The class of potential 
defendants and potential plaintiffs is thus limited. 
43 Admittedly, persons other than purchasers can bring in bottles, but note that the 
payments they collect are not for mere proper behavior. When someone collects the bottles 
lying in the stands after a football game and takes them to a store to collect the deposits, 
she is paid, not for refraining from harm (mere proper behavior), but for undoing the harm 
that others have done. The prospect of reward has thus given her an incentive to provide 
an affirmative benefit. 
44 Paying people to do what is morally required may not always undermine their sense 
of moral obligation. Sometimes children who are paid for getting good grades or for cleaning 
their rooms thereby learn to do those things without payment. 
45 Someone who buys a bottled drink is required to leave the grocer some extra money 
as a deposit, which the grocer will pay to those who return bottles. Grocers and drink 
manufacturers also may bear some of the cost; the grocer may need extra staff or physical 
space to deal with bottle returns, and, since bottle deposits will increase prices, it is likely 
that bottle-deposit requirements will reduce sales. 
46 See for example Gordon, supra note 5, at section I (arguments from corrective justice). 
47 Note that, although one of the purposes of intellectual-property law is the maintenance 
of ab ante incentives, the rules it sets up can operate only after something has been created. 
48 For cases in which much of the world benefits, and where the transaction costs of 
identifying who benefits would therefore be astronomic, the law tends to conclude that 
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Provided that the subject matter of the protected work is sufficiently 
marked off to give the user fair notice that employing it will trigger an 
obligation of payment, and provided that the user's motivations are com-
mercial, valuation is unlikely to cause difficulties. While the creator may 
be a volunteer in the sense that no one may have asked him or her to 
create, it is up to the user/infringer to decide whether or not to use the 
work. At that stage, the commercial user's decision indicates that the 
user wants to employ the work and can bargain with the creator for an 
appropriate price. 49 
The user will also find it more difficult to object on the basis of ''forced 
purchase" or coercion than would the recipient of a harm-avoidance ef-
fort. True, the user of an intellectual product might argue that he is being 
forced to choose between paying for the work and doing without. How-
ever, the benefit creator has added that choice to the user's relevant 
range of choices (unlike those extortionists who say "Pay me or I'll take 
away something you already have"), and it is a contribution she probably 
was not obliged to make. 50 So although coercion in the form of forced 
purchase is still present, the coercion is of a less troubling sort. That there 
will be some coercion-in the sense of some nonconsensual limitation of 
one's choices-is inevitable. 51 
In sum, there are clearly fewer normative and incentive difficulties in 
having a legal system award payments to persons who make others better 
off by creating new works of authorship or invention than there would 
be in having a legal system award payments to persons who merely take 
actions that avoid harming others. Therefore, the common law's reluc-
there is no intellectual property, just as it says there will be no restitution in general cases 
exhibiting that characteristic. Thus, it may be that the law does not give ownership rights 
in general ideas and discoveries (such as the discovery of gravity) in part because of the 
high transaction costs that would be involved in tracing the effects of such basic building 
blocks. Compare John Dawson, The Self-serving Intermeddler, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1408, 1412 
(1974). 
49 Even in these cases, however, there may be circumstances that make reliance on the 
market unwise. For example, there may be less than complete prior warning of a work's 
contents. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 1627-35 (circumstances that may justify a departure 
from the market). 
5° For arguments that the public has neither a positive nor a normative entitlement to the 
price and quantity of works that they could have obtained in a world without intellectual-
property rights, see Gordon, supra note 1, at 1446-55 and 1460-65; for arguments that the 
creators of intellectual products have a normatively acceptable conditional entitlement to 
be paid for the works they produce, see id. at 1455-60, and Gordon, supra note 5, at section 
W (presenting a modified corrective justice claim). 
51 If users are not forced to choose between paying and doing without, creators will be 
forced to choose between not selling at all and enabling their customers to use their work 
in competition with them. The inevitability of coercion in the intellectual-property context 
is discussed at more length in Gordon, supra note l, at 1425-35, and sources cited therein. 
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tance to use restitution as a means of controlling harm-causing behavior 
does not cast a cloud over intellectual property. 
Ill. VOLUNTEERS AND FREE RIDERS 
A. Restitution's Rules against Rewarding Volunteers 
The rule against granting restitution to persons who refrain from caus-
ing harm is a fairly easy rule to justify. Let us take one more step in the 
direction of difficulty. How should the law treat persons who do not 
merely refrain from harm, but who confer affirmative benefits on others?52 
For them, awarding restitution would seem not to raise dangers of extor-
tion and eroding norms. Further, it is well recognized that one is ordi-
narily behaving rightfully when one refuses to labor on another's behalf 
and that, because of this entitlement, labor can be the premise for a valid 
contract. Nevertheless, the well-known doctrine prohibiting restitution 
to "officious intermeddlers" and "volunteers " 53 provides that persons 
whose labor makes others better off will ordinarily have no legal recourse 
if they labor without advance agreement. Yet intellectual-product produc-
ers can sue to obtain payment for the "fruits of their labor" from copyists 
who never agreed to pay. Can these results be squared? 
To prevail in restitution, persons whose voluntary actions provide ben-
efits to others must ordinarily show one of a few very narrow justifica-
tions for departing from the market: mistake,54 coercion,55 request, 56 or 
a narrow range of exigent situations, such as danger to life and health. 57 
Even then, a benefactor's ability to recover will often be further restricted 
by the court's desire to be sure that the defendant really was benefited 
52 As noted above, the usual baseline for determining harm and benefit in common-law 
tort causes us to ask what the complaining party's welfare level would have been had there 
been no interaction with the other party. This is also the baseline implicitly used in most 
everyday discourse and the one used in this article to define harm and benefit. This common-
place baseline is, in turn, consistent with the normative baseline I defend elsewhere: that 
strangers ordinarily have no entitlement to the goods others' efforts produce. See sources 
cited in note 5 supra. If so, then they are not "harmed" if deprived of those goods, and, if 
given some, are "benefited" from the perspective of either a positive or normative baseline. 
53 Restatement of Restitution, supra note 9, at § 2; see also id. at §§ 106, 112. It is 
sometimes said that, when recovery is denied, plaintiffs tend to be called "intermeddlers," 
but, when they win, they are more likely to be called "volunteers." Both words refer, 
however, to the same basic pattern: conferring benefits on someone who has not asked for 
them. This article uses the terms interchangeably. 
54 Id. at §§ 6-69. 
55 Id. at §§ 70-106. 
56 Id. at §§ 107-11. 
57 Id. at § 112. The Restatement's necessity exception is itself built on few cases. 
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and that forcing him to pay or disgorge will not leave him worse off than 
he would have been in the status quo ante. 58 Other limitations tailored to 
particular situations (such as the requirement that only a person who 
"intends to charge" may recover payment for services rendered in an 
emergency)59 further restrict the voluntary actor's ability to sue for pay-
ment in recompense for beneficial labors performed. 
The Restatement of Restitution is not hospitable to persons who gener-
ate benefits as a by-product of self-serving activity. "A person who, 
incidentally to the performance of his own duty or to the protection or 
improvement of his own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is 
not thereby entitled to contribution. " 6° For example, a mine owner whose 
drainage efforts clear both her mine and her neighbor's mine of waters is 
not entitled to contribution from the neighbor.61 
A person who writes a book and publishes it is certainly operating in 
the furtherance of his or her own interests. Except in regard to someone 
who has bargained with the author for production of the work (such as a 
patron, granting agency, employer, or contract publisher), the author is 
a sort of volunteer. When a book is mass marketed, many strangers will 
come across it. If a stranger makes copies of the book for sale, copyright 
law will give the author a right of action against the copyist even if the 
author "volunteered" to send the work into the stream of commerce. 
Since that right of action will be available whether or not the copyist had 
a contract with the author promising to refrain from copying and whether 
or not the copyist's actions harm the author,62 it is clear that, under 
copyright law, a unilateral transfer of ''benefits'' is sufficient to trigger 
liability. 
How then can copyright or any other form of intellectual property be 
squared with the rules against giving restitutionary rights to "volun-
teers"? I will suggest that the reasons for denying recovery in volunteer 
cases do not apply to most conflicts over intellectual property. 
One basis for the refusal to reward volunteers is the danger of compul-
sion and a preference for free choice: one should not be required to pay 
58 See, for example, id. at §§ 40 and 109, comment b. 
59 Id. at § 114. See Landes & Posner, supra note 17. 
60 Restatement of Restitution, supra note 9, at § 106. There are situations in which 
protecting one's own interests does not bar restitution, but these tend to be associated with 
coercion, as where a property owner discharges another's duty when that is the only way 
to prevent a third party from lawfully taking the property. Id. at §103. 
61 Id. at § 106, illustration 2. 
62 Sometimes the absence of harm may make it easier to obtain fair use treatment, how-
ever. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). 
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for what one has not asked for. 63 The classic justification for the volun-
teer/intermeddlers doctrine is that, without it, a recipient of benefits, who 
is best capable of handling his or her own affairs, would be forced to 
cede control to the intermeddling of outsiders, whether well meaning or 
self-serving.64 Another related concern is that if any compulsion is im-
posed, it be imposed fairly. 
Also, there is a concern with avoiding harm to the defendants-a con-
cern that restitution might require the recipients of benefits to pay more 
than the benefits are worth to them.65 If the recipients have not bargained 
in advance, it is hard for a court to know how to value the benefits 
conferred and hard to be sure that subjecting the recipients to restitution 
would not leave them worse off in the end than if they had received 
nothing. No one can afford to pay market price for all the desirable goods 
in the world. 
Another set of concerns involve deleterious systemic effects. Restitu-
tion may undermine the operation of efficient markets, for example. 66 
Consumers should actively seek out the lowest prices for products and 
services that best meet their needs and not be forced to pay for whatever 
a volunteer foists on them.67 Further, willing buyers and sellers can set 
up a pricing mechanism more effectively than can a court operating at 
second remove. If the availability of restitution substitutes courts for 
markets, there could be a sharp increase in administrative costs and an 
increased risk of inefficient resource allocation. Such systemic costs 
could be considerable.68 
63 See John Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred without Request, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 
1183 (1966); Edward W. Hope, Officiousness (Parts I and II), 15 Cornell L. Q. 25, 205 
(1923-24). 
64 It has been argued, for example, that, if courts allow recovery for benefits conferred 
without request, "the only person reasonably secure against demands he has never assented 
to create, will be the person who, possessing nothing, is thereby protected against anything 
being accidentally improved by another to his cost and to his ruin." Isle Royal Mining Co. 
v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332, 338 (1877) (as quoted in Wade, supra note 63). 
65 We have seen this concern operating before. See text at notes 28-29 supra. 
66 Levmore, supra note 10. 
67 This justification, in turn, has several dimensions: if consumers know what is best for 
themselves and are likely to reveal their preferences honestly only in actual bargaining, 
then court-imposed bargains will be a poor substitute for real markets. See, for example, 
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability 
Rules: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev 1089 (1972). Consumers left to them-
selves will find efficient providers because such providers will provide more product for 
less money; a restitution system would undermine efficiency by giving payment to inefficient 
providers who happen to be fast enough to provide the desired thing before the consumer 
has concluded his or her bargain with the intended supplier. See Levmore, supra note 10. 
68 The goal of reducing systemic costs, like the other goals discussed here, is not an 
absolute. For example, the cases reflect no single-minded devotion to finding the lowest-cost 
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In the following section, this article suggests that, in the typical 
intellectual-property context, where one person deliberately sets out to 
use a work authored by another, awarding restitution would be consistent 
with the goals of preserving autonomy, avoiding harm, and minimizing 
systemic costs. It also suggests that it is a desire to achieve these goals-
and not an indifference to rewarding and internalizing benefits-that ex-
plains the overall volunteer rule. 
B. The Structure of Plaintiff/Defendant Relations 
in Torts and Restitution 
Comparing the structure of the relationship between plaintiff and defen-
dant in volunteer cases and in intellectual-property cases will lay to rest 
a large part of the asymmetry challenge. In the initial discussion of the 
purported asymmetry in the common law's treatment of harms and bene-
fits,69 cases where suits for harms would be allowed were implicitly com-
pared with cases where suits for benefits would be disallowed. If we 
compare the underlying fact patterns handled respectively by tort law 
and by the restitution doctrines regarding volunteers, however, we see 
they are distinguished not only by the difference between harm and bene-
fit but also by the far different roles played by the defendant in the two 
classes of cases. I will argue that the difference between the underlying 
structure of tort suits and the structure of the paradigmatic volunteer 
cases provides a more plausible explanation for any difference in result 
between torts and volunteer cases than the mere difference between harm 
and benefit. 
In all the classic examples in which the law would refuse restitution, 
the benefactor conferred benefits on the other party without that party's 
having sought them. When Harriet's hotel complex causes a rise in land 
prices or when the drainage effort of a mine owner clears both her and 
her neighbor's mine of waters,70 or when M recommends H's services so 
that H's profits rise, 71 none of the recipients has asked for their benefits 
or has even had the opportunity to refuse them. In each case a volunteer 
as plaintiff is paired with an "involuntary recipient" as defendant. Let 
us call these "paradigmatic pairs" since this pairing presents the para-
alternative but simply a preference for avoiding high costs and for giving desirable incentives 
where possible within the constraints imposed by other goals. 
69 See text at notes 9-J2 supra. 
70 Restatement of Restitution, supra note 9, at § J06, illustration 2. See also Levmore, 
supra note JO, at 72 (no restitution when W cleans up his own groundwater and causes an 
increase in the purity of his neighbors' wells). 
71 Levmore, supra note JO. 
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digmatic structure for which the volunteer/intermeddler doctrine was ini-
tially crafted. It should be contrasted with the pairing of injurer and victim 
in the ordinary tort case. 
In the ordinary tort case, the person sued did something to bring the 
suit on him or herself. D has imposed a cost on P without P's consent, 
so there is some fairness in using the legal system to make D respond in 
kind. 
In restitution cases involving the paradigmatic pair, P helps D, and 
then P sues D. The only active person is P. Involuntary recipient D has 
done nothing: D has neither forced P to generate benefits nor actively 
worked to direct those benefits toward himself.72 The volunteer P cannot 
credibly claim to be redressing any burdens involuntarily thrust upon her 
by D. The only thing that Pis suffering involuntarily is D's nonpayment. 
While one can see why the injurer in a tort case might be considered 
responsible for the plaintiff's injury, it is harder to see why the involun-
tary recipient in a restitution case should be responsible for the plaintiff's 
failure to negotiate a fee in advance. 73 
Where a plaintiff's claim is not based on an action by the defendant, 
the plaintiff's suit has a lesser claim to fairness. At least a century of 
jurisprudence has seen in our system's insistence on an "act" as a prereq-
uisite of liability a means of reconciling fairly the citizenry's simultaneous 
claims for security and liberty. 74 The law's refusal to impose liability on 
the passive member of a paradigmatic pair is consistent with this tradi-
72 I do not mean to overstate the active/passive distinction. The line between the two 
categories is elusive. For example, by taking advantage of what the volunteer has done 
without rendering repayment, the recipient may be "acting" in a way that decreases the 
importance of his or her initial lack of choice. 
73 This latter argument owes its origins to a comment in Charles Fried, The Artificial 
Reason for the Law, or: What Lawyers Know, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 35, 46 (1981). The strength 
of such fairness-based arguments depends in part on there being market avenues through 
which the plaintiff can seek a fee or otherwise capture the benefits it generates. Where 
plaintiffs cannot reap the relevant payments through consensual agreement, then neither 
party is more fairly responsible than the other for the failure of payment, and the same 
reasons that impel the law to "make bargains" in torts and other areas can potentially 
justify liability here. As discussed below, without property rights the fee-collecting efforts 
of intellectual-product creators will often be blocked by transaction costs and strategic 
behaviors among users. Similarly, in some restitution cases, emergencies make resort to 
the market impossible. In such contexts, Fried's argument against restitutionary recovery 
would be inapplicable. 
74 See, for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 115 (M. D. Howe ed. 
1963); and Epstein, supra note 14. Although Holmes and Epstein are an odd set of bookends 
(with Holmes insisting that the mere fact that an act causes harm should not alone be a 
sufficient basis for liability and Epstein's one-time insistence on the opposite), they are not 
unusual in agreeing that the law should not impose liability where an act is lacking. 
Of course, there have also been many contrary strains in that same jurisprudential cen-
tury. Some instrumentalist approaches, for example, might impose liability precisely to 
encourage action where it was formerly absent. 
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tional balance. The no-recovery rule in such cases would seem to be 
attributable more to the passivity of the defendant than to a distinction 
between harm and benefit. 
Restitution's paradigmatic pairs do not appear in the typical intellec-
tual-property case. 75 Although one might well view intellectual-property 
plaintiffs as volunteers, intellectual-property defendants who seek out 
a creative work and deliberately copy it for their own gain are hardly 
involuntary recipients. As in ordinary tort suits, the fact patterns that 
ordinarily give rise to intellectual-property suits have active defendants. 
Within restitution itself the presence of a choice by the defendant tends 
to assist plaintiffs in recovery. 76 Therefore, the volunteer pattern does 
not condemn intellectual-property recoveries. 
An example will illustrate the importance of this active/passive issue. 
Levmore, in arguing that the law treats harms and benefits asymmetri-
cally, presented the following example. "[I]f M often recommends H's 
services so that H enjoys increased profits, H owes no restitution-
whether or not Mis paid by those seeking advice. Yet if M defames H's 
business, H can collect for lost income. " 77 But praise is not the true 
benefits analogue to defamation. For, in defamation, the defendant M has 
been active, while, as a recipient of praise, defendant H has been passive. 
The better analogue to defamation is a case where the defendant actively 
advertises that M has praised his business, using M's name and kind 
words as an endorsement to increase profits. This case turns the harm 
element into benefit but retains all the other elements of the defamation 
action, including the active status of the defendant. In endorsement 
cases, a suit to recoup the benefits received is far from disfavored by the 
courts. In virtually all states today, the putative endorser, whether a 
private person or a celebrity, can sue for use of his name in such a 
connection under the rights of privacy or publicity-asserting a right to 
restitution, if you will, good against those who actively seek a particular 
kind of benefit. 
C. Beyond the Involuntary Recipient 
Suits for restitution by intermeddlers have three implicit but separable 
components: First, the plaintiff claims that she has given the defendant 
75 Where such pairs do appear, plaintiffs should lose even in the intellectual-property 
context. 
76 See, for example, Birks, supra note 29, at 114-16, 263; Wade, supra note 63, at 1212 
(restitution favored if the benefactor "affords the other an opportunity to decline the benefit 
or else has a reasonable excuse for failing to do so"). 
77 Levmore, supra note 10. 
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something of hers that warrants payment. With intellectual products that 
is typically labor combined with the money and other resources that the 
plaintiff invested in the making of the intellectual product. Second, the 
plaintiff asserts that her claim to payment should not be defeated by 
the fact that she no longer has her usual leverage by which to obtain pay-
ment by contract. Third, the plaintiff asserts that this claim to payment 
should not be defeated by the involuntary nature of the setting in which 
the benefit was transferred to the defendant. 
Let us dispose of the involuntariness issue by assuming that intel-
lectual-property suits should be limited to those occasions where the 
recipient voluntarily seeks the transfer of benefits to himself. 78 We would 
then have to face the merits of the remaining two components of the 
claim. The plaintiff was once in control of the labor and other assets, and 
the law would have prevented strangers from forcefully extracting them 
from her-but she allowed them to escape her control by investing them 
in the creation of a product which she sold. Now someone threatens to 
reap more from the plaintiff's efforts than she bargained for: the pur-
chaser of her book, boat hull, or invention may have wanted only to use 
the object she sold him, but now some third party wants to copy it and sell 
the reproductions. Should resources voluntarily invested warrant explicit 
extracontractual judicial protection against deliberate use by others? 
If deliberate uses of others' efforts always triggered an obligation of 
payment, it would cause paralysis. What defines a community is interde-
pendence: persons learn from each other, sell complementary products, 
build on a common heritage.79 A general principle requiring payment 
for all benefits reaped would destroy the synergy on which culture and 
commerce both rest. But sometimes need and practicality may conjoin 
to make some such protection desirable; after all, one purpose of tangible 
property law itself is to offer extracontractual legal protection for volun-
tary investment, as when farmers can call on the law to prevent maraud-
ers from raiding their storehouses. 
78 Of course, even a person who actively seeks out benefits may not voluntarily pay for 
them, but that is a separate issue. All property involves involuntariness about payment: if 
you take my briefcase, the law makes you pay for it even though you may not want to. While 
that is coercion of a sort (see Robert Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 
Colum. L. Rev. 603, 612 (1943)), it is still premised on some sort of voluntary action on 
your part (taking the briefcase) in effectuating the basic transfer. If one were to reformulate 
the analysis to incorporate the involuntariness about payment, then one would say that 
defendants in paradigmatic volunteer cases have two claims of involuntariness: (a) they 
were involuntarily forced to receive benefits, and (b) now the plaintiff is seeking to force 
them involuntarily to pay for what they received. The focus here is claim a. The focus of 
Section IIIF infra will be on claim b. 
79 See, for example, Dawson, supra note 48. 
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Some criteria immediately suggest themselves as candidates for mark-
ing off those areas of enrichment that are suitable for judicially ordered 
payment.8° First, as the discussion above suggests, intentionality on the 
recipient's part is one factor relevant to the appropriateness of granting 
a right over benefits. Whether or not the benefits are substantial (rather 
than de minimis) and whether they are traceable to their origins are two 
others. In addition, it is likely that a lawmaker will feel it unnecessary to 
order restitution for a benefit that is of a reciprocal sort81 unless it is 
necessary for incentives.82 
But even substantial and nonreciprocal benefits can be deliberately 
utilized without a duty of payment being imposed. For example, hundreds 
of motels and restaurants may be built (quite intentionally) to take advan-
tage of a tourist attraction like Disneyworld without the Disney organiza-
tion having any right of recompense. Sections IIID through IIIF examine 
additional criteria that may account for this pattern and their implications 
for intellectual property. 
D. Harm and Autonomy: Demarcation 
As noted earlier, courts often deny restitutionary recovery where de-
fendants are passive, in part to protect the defendants from being harmed 
and having their autonomy impaired. But limiting any restitutionary right 
to intentional uses will provide less than complete protection for defen-
dants. 
If things are not bounded and marked, the strong possibility exists 
that people will knowingly use them-and thus trigger an obligation of 
payment-but do so without knowing they are using something that has 
a price tag. As a result, they may be worse off after receiving the "bene-
fit" and having to pay for it than they would have been had they never 
received it at all. Thus, in addition to intentionality, there must be demar-
cation; things that trigger obligations of payment must be identifiable in 
advance and marked as such. The legislature must define the covered 
subject matters (books? inventions? ideas?), and producers must provide 
a way to indicate which of the potentially covered subject matters (this 
book?) are owned and by whom. 
If owned things are defined and marked as owned, then people likely 
80 For a full discussion of relevant criteria and their application, see Gordon, supra note 
5, at sections Ill-IV. 
81 Reciprocity minimizes the likelihood there will be unfairness between parties. 
82 See, generally, Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1987) (Tragic 
Common, Prisoner's Dilemma, and other examples show that even the presence of recipro-
cal payoffs does not guarantee mutually beneficial cooperative behavior). 
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will refrain from using those things unless they believe that the use is 
worth the charge they will later have to bear (discounted by the possibility 
of enforcement). Notice and warning reduce the danger that recipients 
will have to pay more for a thing than the value they place on it. Notice 
can also minimize the administrative costs of tracing ownership. 
For this and other reasons, demarcation plays a strong role in intellec-
tual property. 83 Patents must be clearly defined and placed on record; 
owners of patents, copyrights, and trademarks are encouraged to mark 
their works with notices (the famous "C in a circle" is only one of many 
such notices);84 and there are governmental facilities to register one's 
copyright, trademark, or patent claim. Further, traditional intellectual-
property doctrines largely limit their protection to fairly clearly bounded 
and demarked subject matters-such as works ''fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression" for copyright.85 Even those states that permit recov-
ery for unauthorized use of "ideas" generally require that these ideas be 
concrete and narrow. Similarly, when the New York Court of Appeals 
was asked to decide whether an extemporaneous conversation of a fa-
mous author could be owned, the court stressed the importance of "dis-
tinct, identifiable boundaries. " 86 
So long as demarcation is practicable and practiced, intellectual prop-
erty can avoid some of the most obvious dangers to autonomy: users will 
know in advance if they are using something that imposes an obligation 
83 It has also long been recognized, for example, that clear demarcation contributes to 
the efficient working of markets. See, for example, Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Founda-
tion for Exchange, 14 J. Legal Stud. 321 (1985); Gordon, supra note 18, at 1612. 
84 The copyright notice had been and is no longer mandatory, though advantages still 
adhere to its use. 
85 In fact, controversy over standards of infringement in intellectual-property law fre-
quently centers on the danger that their application will blur otherwise-distinct subject-
matter boundaries. 
86 The court noted that, even if conversation were capable of ownership (a question the 
opinion did not reach), in order to recover, a speaker would have to "indicate that he 
intended to mark off the utterance in question from the ordinary stream of speech, that he 
meant to adopt it as a unique statement and that he wanted to exercise control over its 
publication." Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 241, 244, N.E.2d 250 
(1968) (dicta). The case illustrates the importance of demarcation to the fair treatment of 
defendants. A. E. Hotchner wrote a biography of his friend Ernest Hemingway, which 
quoted extensively from their conversations. When Hotchner used the conversations, he 
had no idea ownership would be claimed in Hemingway's oral speech, but, later, 
Hemingway's widow brought a suit against Hotchner claiming such ownership. Had she 
prevailed, the biographer would no doubt have been taken by surprise-despite the fact 
that his use was intentional. He might have been forced to sacrifice the book or, in order 
to save it, to pay the widow much more than the verbatim record of the conversations had 
been worth to him ab ante. In the end, the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the 
widow's suit. 
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of payment and can decide whether the benefit to them is likely to exceed 
the price. 
E. Systemic Costs and Benefits 
One reason for refusing to order restitution for an intentional reaping 
of benefits is that a potential benefactor may be able to obtain payment 
without recourse to the courts. In the typical volunteer case, it is the 
volunteer (the future plaintiff) who knows what she is about to do and is 
in the best position to make a bargain about it. Harriet knows that her 
hotel will raise land values where it locates, the mine owner knows that 
her efforts in pumping and draining will help her neighbors, and M knows 
that his recommendations will help H's business. And even if they do 
not know, persons like them are in a better position to know than are 
unknowing recipients. 87 There is usually no good purpose served in letting 
such persons go to court. 
If the volunteer thinks the law will not give restitution, then she will 
seek to make a bargain by asking the potential recipients for contributions 
before the project begins. Something like this happens in oil exploration: 
neighboring lessees will learn a great deal about whether or not it is 
worthwhile to drill under their own land from the results of their neigh-
bor's drilling. So "dry-hole contribution agreements" have come into 
being: contracts by which the neighbor who stands to benefit from the 
information agrees to pay a share of his neighbor's drilling costs should 
the hole come up dry. In many shopping malls, where small stores are 
likely to benefit from the propinquity of large department stores that draw 
masses of customers, the small stores may be willing to pay extra rent 
to subsidize the larger stores' entry. Similarly, if landowners like Peter 
are likely to benefit from a venture like Harriet's, she might try to per-
suade them to pay her something to encourage her to build nearby. Or, 
as another alternative, the owner of an attraction could simply buy the 
land on which the beneficial spillovers will fall. This is apparently what 
the Disney organization did with Epcot Center: it bought up surrounding 
land and built on it enough hotels and restaurants to capture much of the 
benefit Epcot generates. 
If a benefit-generating landowner has realistic opportunities that she 
lets slip through her fingers, there is no reason for the judiciary to come 
to her aid. As a mode of internalization, market bargains are clearly 
preferable to restitution suits, with their attendant problems of uncertain 
87 The law often makes judgments based on the likely distribution not only of information 
but also of information costs. 
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valuation, forced purchase, and the like.88 Therefore, at a minimum, there 
needs to be some good reason for the plaintiff's failure to have sought 
advance consent from the benefit's recipient. 
In restitution law, the range of acceptable reasons is quite limited, 
as mentioned above: mistake, request, coercion, and a narrow range of 
emergencies. One can understand the narrowness; given the continual 
use by everyone of benefits generated by others, sharp boundaries are 
needed to keep us off the slippery slope that could lead to a paralyzing 
morass of claims.89 
How does this relate to intellectual property? 
Objections to restitution based on high systemic costs lose much of 
their force where the presence of a restitutionary right will allow markets 
to evolve, rather than substitute for a market transaction.90 In the classic 
volunteer setting, giving volunteers a restitutionary right may discourage 
them from seeking the consent of potential recipients,91 but, in the 
intellectual-property setting, giving creators restitutionary rights tends to 
encourage consensual markets.92 
This occurs largely because the identity of the party who has superior 
access to information and who is otherwise better able to enter transac-
tions is different in the two contexts; the law needs to speak to the party 
able to react to its messages. 93 In the volunteer context, the benefactor 
88 There also may be nonmarket alternatives that have advantages over individualized 
restitution suits. For example, if coordination problems among Peter and his fellow land-
owners prevent them from reaching agreement with Harriet, she-as a potential generator 
of beneficial spillovers-might also seek subsidies or tax breaks from the local government. 
Conceivably, such an entity might have institutional information-gathering advantages over 
a court. 
89 Thus, proposals to award restitution whenever transaction costs bar otherwise-
desirable trades considerably overshoot the mark. For such a proposal, see Note, A Theory 
of Hypothetical Contract, 94 Yale L. J. 415 (1984). 
90 Intentional torts like trespass have both characteristics: they encourage consensual 
bargains but, when someone disregards an owner's right to withhold consent, they give the 
owner at least a market-like payment via the tort damage remedy. Punitive damages and 
criminal law "kickers" further encourage use of the consensual route. Calabresi & Mel-
amed, supra note 67. 
91 Even within the volunteer area, there can be occasions when giving restitutionary 
rights will not inhibit market formation; on those occasions, the law is more likely to give 
restitution. See Levmore, supra note 10. 
92 Intellectual-property law also imposes liability for harms, of course, which can operate 
to preserve markets; but markets capable of being harmed may not come into being unless 
the law gives some right over benefits. (As elsewhere in the article, I am defining harm and 
benefits in relation to a status quo baseline.) Therefore, the restitutionary species of right 
is the more fundamental. 
93 If information is distributed in such a way that only a potential plaintiff can react to a 
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(plaintiff) has the greater access to information, and the rule of law that 
speaks to the plaintiff and encourages him to engage in desirable market-
forming behavior is a rule of no liability. 94 In the intellectual-property 
situation, by contrast, a no-liability rule creates the possibility of market-
impeding strategic behaviors. Because here it is the recipient/copyist (de-
fendant) who has the greater access to information and who can better 
initiate a transaction,95 the rule that would encourage the formation of 
markets would be a rule that imposes liability. The rule of law in each 
case gives the party with information and ability to internalize the incen-
tive to do so. 
To illustrate the reasons why a rule of no liability would have little 
effect in encouraging creators to make bargains with potential users, note 
that it is the copyist (the future defendant) who knows what he is about 
to do and is in the best position to make a bargain about it. The creator 
may not even know that a potential copyist exists. As a result, a creator 
who wanted to respond to a rule of no liability by making bargains with 
potential users might be unable to do so. Since a copyist, who is in the 
best position to initiate bargaining, will seek to make a bargain only if he 
thinks that his unconsented use will result in liability, a rule imposing 
liability on the copyist is likely to best internalize benefits to the author. 
Enforcement practicalities aside, such liability defeats much strategic 
behavior and brings needed information forward: a potential copyist has 
an incentive to identify his needs and seek a license if he knows copying 
rule of law by contracting around it, then, other things being equal, a no-liability rule is 
preferable. This is the volunteer case. If information is distributed in a way that only a 
potential defendant can bargain around the applicable legal rule, then, other things being 
equal, a rule imposing liability is preferable. This is the intellectual-property case. 
In the volunteer cases, internalization is effectuated by consensual arrangements, against 
a background of liberty-to-use that is potentially distressing to the provider of benefits. In 
the intellectual-property cases, internalization also occurs via the market but against a 
background of judicial compulsion potentially distressing to the copyist. 
94 If restitution suits were available to volunteers, they could choose whether to proceed 
via suit or via consensual bargain. Volunteers who have poor quality goods or unreliable 
skills are precisely those who might fear that recipients will refuse what they have to offer 
and who might prefer to sue rather than worry about the recipient saying "no." Volunteers 
who expect recipients to be willing to pay are likely to prefer face-to-face negotiations. 
But direct negotiations are not always practicable, even for the possessors of skills and 
objects that others desire. Conceivably, rather than refusing to give restitution, the law 
could condition recovery on proof of a net monetizable benefit to the recipient, coupled 
with proof either of the volunteer's having made a good faith effort to proceed via the 
market or that market failure precluded even such effort. Compare Note, supra note 89. 
95 See also Holderness, supra note 83 (analyzing the transferability of open versus closed 
entitlements). 
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without permission will trigger liability. 96 Because of this, a rule imposing 
liability helps cure market failure in the intellectual-product context. 97 
Of course, occasional cases of market failure should not immediately 
trigger judicial exceptions. The cost of making individualized inquiries is 
high. For example, in the ordinary property case, it may be appropriate 
for courts to refuse to investigate whether market arrangements are im-
practicable because a closed-door policy may usefully encourage internal-
ization by contract to occur fairly frequently. 98 Where consensual bar-
gains cannot be reached in a definable and significantly large class of 
cases-arguably, most intellectual-property contexts-a legislative or ju-
dicial body may be acting properly when it declares that class of situa-
tions entitled to different treatment (provided, of course, that the costs 
of maintaining the system do not eat up the resulting gains). 99 
From the incentive perspective, a benefactor need not be paid so long 
as that person, and persons like him, would engage in the benefit-
generating activity regardless of the possibility of obtaining restitution 
from beneficiaries. In many restitution cases, the plaintiffs had their own 
sufficient motives for engaging in the activities independent of the poten-
tial payment from the recipient. 100 A court may presume that, because 
the person seeking payment has already engaged in the valuable activity, 
% There is the possibility that, even with liability, a copyist will copy without permission 
in the hope that he or she will not be apprehended. This introduces familiar questions about 
remedy and deterrence. 
97 For a fuller outline of the way intellectual-property rights encourage markets, see 
Gordon, supra note 18, at 1610-14 (markets in copyright); for other economic functions 
served by copyright doctrines, see Landes & Posner, supra note 3. 
98 An important part of the classic public-goods problem is strategic behavior by consum-
ers: underdisclosure of their desire for a good they can obtain without paying. In the 
paradigmatic volunteer cases, the danger of strategic behavior is low. The recipients are 
readily identifiable in advance and are usually limited in number, so bargaining is likely to 
be fairly easy. The very fact that a volunteer chooses litigation over advance bargaining is 
therefore suspicious, suggesting that the recipient would have thought the benefit not worth 
the price tag. 
There is a possibility, however, that a recipient will refuse to pay even if he values the 
benefit at more than the price demanded, attempting to free ride by gambling on the volun-
teer's willingness to continue without his contribution. In the land context, where the 
development is in the public interest, the government may be able to solve the problem by 
using eminent domain. Where eminent domain is not appropriate, desirable development 
may not occur. See Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. Legal Stud. 351, 359 
(1991); see also id. at 362 (special legal rights solving an analogous problem in the corporate 
context). 
99 As was suggested earlier, the availability of self-regulating market avenues in most 
intellectual-property contexts should keep the transaction costs fairly low. 
100 For example, the mine owner who drains her mine and also happens to drain her 
neighbor's. 
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incentives are irrelevant. Of course, if the benefactor is engaged in an 
act that others are likely to replicate, incentives should remain relevant. 
But the restitution court may have no way to know if there exists a 
substantial class of persons like the plaintiff, who have not yet engaged 
in the valuable activity but would do so if restitution were assured. The 
varying fact patterns of different volunteer cases may make it difficult for 
a court to generalize to classes of activities or to make predictions about 
categories of behavior. In such cases, ex post reasoning may be a court's 
only recourse. It is also possible that other restitution cases may under-
play the need to provide incentives because they arise out of situations 
like those involving mistake, where the parties, because they fail to un-
derstand their situation, are not aware that restitution is directly impli-
cated and is likely to affect their payoffs. Judicial efforts to create ab 
ante incentives can have only muted effects when addressed to parties 
whose primary attention is elsewhere. 
With intellectual products, by contrast, the actors know their fortunes 
will be affected by the shape of intellectual-property law. Further, the 
existence of potential incentive effects is obvious. 101 
In a world without intellectual-property rights, an author may want to 
bargain with her audience for payment, but the audience cannot be identi-
fied in advance. Further, the benefits are those that will flow from an as 
yet undisclosed intellectual product. 102 Even if the author could somehow 
identify and contact all the potential recipients-an expensive propo-
sition-the creator is unlikely to be successful in her effort to obtain a 
payment from each. Many of those potential customers may refuse to 
pay, preferring to gamble on the possibility that others' monies will be 
sufficient to draw the work into publication, when they can then make a 
cheap copy. The odds on the gamble may seem good if there is a large 
group of potential purchasers. Also, the work's contents may be un-
known since the author may be trying to trade disclosure for payment; 
with the benefits uncertain, there is low perceived cost in the event the 
free-ride gamble fails to pay off. 103 If enough people take this apparently 
low-cost gamble in the hope of taking a free ride, the requisite funds 
101 Although intellectual property is commonly premised on the intuitive claim that legal 
protection will increase creators' rewards and thus their incentives to produce, it has also 
been argued that intellectual products will be adequately produced without explicit legal 
intervention; see note 108 infra and accompanying text. 
102 Compare Holderness, supra note 83. 
103 Also, if the work is as yet undisclosed, there is an element of risk even in paying the 
creator: the work when received may turn out not to have been worth what was paid. For 
all these reasons, an audience member may decide that the net payoff of the free ride 
gamble is higher than that of the purchase gamble. 
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may not be forthcoming. 104 The Prisoner's Dilemma and other free-rider 
games 105 illustrate analogous dynamics. 
Free riding is not unique to intellectual-property cases. The same temp-
tation also plagues land-development efforts and is one of the reasons 
why governments are given the power of eminent domain. 106 The problem 
is endemic and worse with intellectual property. 107 Just as eminent do-
main can solve the strategic behavior problems in land development, 
copyright can solve these strategic behavior problems among authors and 
users. 
The presence of a publisher does not much alter the desirability of 
granting intellectual-property rights to resolve potential bargaining stale-
mates. Admittedly, the author may find it easier to deal with a publisher 
than with an undifferentiated audience (only one party, low transaction 
costs), but then the publisher must deal with the audience. The author's 
problems with information, transaction costs, and free riders would sim-
104 The danger, of course, is the classic public goods problem: that the resulting pattern 
of low funding will discourage desirable endeavors. An intellectual product is, in Harold 
Demsetz's phrase, a "privately produced public good." See Harold Demsetz, The Private 
Production of Public Goods, 13 J. Law & Econ. 293 (1970). 
It might be argued that, if members of the audience are unable to coordinate themselves 
to overcome this problem simultaneously and voluntarily, then the group members could, 
in stages, sign a contract to impose duties of contribution on themselves that would be 
effective only upon the assent of all or a designated percentage of them. Indeed, if audience 
members could reliably impose such duties on themselves, court-imposed rules would be 
unnecessary. Most of the same information gaps, transaction costs, and free-rider problems, 
however, would plague a group of audience members in their efforts to obtain consent to 
such a contract as would afflict an author or publisher. 
105 See Charles Goetz, Law and Economics 12-37 (1984); Morton D. Davis, Game Theory 
95-103, 128-31 (1970). 
106 A related reason is the possibility of holdouts. Persons owning land on which the 
developer wants to build may not be able to free ride by holding on to their property; they 
might, in fact, suffer if the development were built around them. They might nevertheless 
engage in strategic behavior-holding out-in order to extract a significant portion of the 
developer's gain. See Cohen, supra note 98. 
Note that eminent domain is allowed only where there is a "public purpose." Judicial 
intervention to cure private parties' frustration regarding free riders and holdouts in the 
land context could be costly; to allow recourse to judge-set prices every time a land buyer 
could make a plausible argument that strategic behavior was blocking an otherwise-desirable 
bargain could drastically undermine the self-regulating market system. For intellectual prop-
erty, however, when it is advisable to end the indeterminacy in which bargaining might be 
floundering, the mode of intervention does not undermine market functioning. Quite the 
contrary. So, not only is the need for intervention likely to arise more often with intangibles 
than with tangibles, but it also has lesser systemic cost. 
107 Denying restitution may work to encourage internalization through voluntary bargain 
in many land cases, and, for real property, this market encouragement may be more valuable 
than the social loss stemming from the occasional bargain that founders. But, for intellectual 
property, denying a right of action is not likely to have the same market-encouraging effect. 
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ply be passed on, one step further down the line. How much would a 
publisher pay for a book that could be lawfully copied by all comers once 
it appeared on the market? Unless the publisher has a lead-time advan-
tage or some other sort of real-world clout108 that can discourage copying, 
the rate the publisher would offer the author in such a world might be 
too low. If the anticipated rate of payment is low, otherwise-desirable 
works may not be created. 
In sum, because of the structure of the volunteer/recipient relation, the 
rule that best speaks to most volunteers is a rule of no liability. Because 
of the structure of the creator/copyist relation, the rule of law that best 
speaks to the copyist is a rule of liability. Thus, the same market-
furthering considerations that suggest there should be no liability in the 
volunteer context suggest that there should be liability in the intellectual-
property context. Further, in most of the fact patterns that give rise to 
volunteer cases, courts are likely to believe ab ante incentives either 
unnecessary or difficult to provide effectually through judicial interven-
tion. 109 By contrast, the need for a liability system to provide positive 
incentives is likely to be greater in regard to intellectual products than it 
is for other kinds of resources, and the commercial producers and users 
of intellectual products are likely to be quite responsive to legal stimuli. 
A strong argument in favor of intellectual-property rights is made when 
the greater need for positive incentives is coupled with a fairly low-cost 
market mechanism for their provision. 110 
108 For example, publishers might threaten to issue retaliatory below-cost editions if pirate 
editions appear. Other noncopyright modes of restraining copying include gentlemen's agree-
ments. book clubs, patron relationships, and technological fences. The classic source here 
is Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Book, Photo-
copies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970); see also Gordon, supra note 
I, at 1334-54, 1400-1405 (discussion of "copy privilege"), and the sources cited therein. 
109 Emergencies constitute an unusual class of volunteer cases, for here incentives are 
predictably important, and the actors know they will be affected by restitution law. This 
reinforces the discussion in the text, for emergencies can give rise to volunteer recoveries. 
See Restatement of Restitution, supra note 9, at§§ 112-17. 
110 I have elsewhere identified this combination as "asymmetric market failure," arguing 
that the case for intellectual property protection is strongest where (I) in the absence of a 
legal right, potential creators of new works will find it difficult to consummate market 
bargains; and (2) potential users of those works who could practicably bargain for licenses 
will be willing and able to do so if the law requires. Where this combination is present, it 
means that, without a duty to pay, there will be positive externalities and that imposing 
such a duty internalizes without throwing the entire matter into the judicial lap. See the 
discussion of asymmetric market failure in Gordon, supra note 5, at section III; also see 
Gordon, supra note 18, at 1610-18 (when market failure makes it unlikely that a potential 
user of a copyrighted work could obtain a socially desirable license to employ the work, 
that favors the user being relieved of liability under the fair use doctrine). 
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F. Fair Compulsion 
Fairness and compulsion are the last of the considerations indentified 
above as contributing to restitution's reluctance to order payment for 
benefits generated. At first blush, a person who intentionally uses a de-
marked, bounded product would seem to have little ground to complain 
if payment is demanded for his use. The purchasing decision remains his 
own. But such a person may still complain that he is being subjected to 
an unfair compulsion, because he is being forced to choose between pay-
ing for what he wants and not having it. Using legal compulsion on per-
sons who act intentionally and after warning is not ipso facto justifiable. 
The bully who says "Cross that line and I'll knock your block off" is 
not and should not be privileged to batter the person who intentionally 
and defiantly crosses the line. He may be a more honorable bully than 
the one who hits the other children without warning, but he remains a 
bully. 111 So even an active recipient can accurately claim he is being 
"compelled" when he is made to pay for a demarked resource he has 
used. 
This is not fatal, however. The primary question is not whether com-
pulsion is used, but whether it is being used fairly. If the user is really 
using something that is a pure benefit to him-a mere increase in the 
number of choices open to him-and if he has no prior entitlement to the 
new thing, then the creator and the law would seem justified in demanding 
that the user pay for this increase in his range of choices. 112 This is the 
basic point of John Locke's theory of property: one who makes some-
thing new without in the process depriving others is entitled to have some 
right in it. 113 The fairness of the compulsion used rests ultimately on 
noneconomic grounds. It seems fair to shift to the noncreator the burden 
of explaining why he should have an entitlement to something that pri-
marily owes its existence to another's effort. 114 
But, to satisfy this claim to fairness and to avoid causing harm, the 
111 Before treating a consent as valid, our law consistently asks whether the person posing 
the choice was entitled to do so. "Your money or your life" is an assault because the 
highwayman is not so entitled. The same inquiry needs to be made treating as a binding 
consent someone's willful encountering of a known cost. See Gordon, supra note I, at 
1425-35 ("consent as a criterion for moral adequacy"). 
112 This assumes that the amount of payment demanded will not exceed the benefit the 
product brings. To the extent the product can be sufficiently demarked and its contents 
known, so as to avoid surprise, this is not likely to be a problem: only a person who wishes 
to use the product at the marked price will do so. 
113 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Second Treatise, at ch. 5 (Peter Laslett 
ed. 1953). 
114 There are indeed grounds for public entitlement, such as free speech or extreme need, 
but they fall far short of yielding strangers all the benefits others generate. See Gordon, 
supra note I, at 1459-65. See also Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to 
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right to restitution would have to be limited to recouping the value added 
by the benefactor. That can be a difficult scheme to implement. 115 Prop-
erty is a simpler scheme. But property can bring with it injunctive powers 
that can extract more than the value added and, thus, would be inconsis-
tent with a restitutionary cause of action based on a claim to be paid for 
labor conferred. In this way, intellectual-property statutes-which do 
give injunctive powers-appear to exceed what the logic of a benefits-
oriented jurisprudence itself would grant. 
Further, the basic principle of restitution gives a right only against 
unjust enrichment that is "at the expense of" the plaintiff, 116 much as 
the right to sue for tort damages is usually limited to plaintiffs who were 
foreseeable. In cases where a right to payment is based on labor ex-
pended, such requirements of nexus would seem to require that the plain-
tiff had expended some labor directed toward this defendant or the mar-
ket he serves. Yet statutory copyright allows suits not only against 
persons selling in an author's expected and as-yet-unrealized markets but 
also against persons who would have been fully outside the plaintiff's 
range of expectation when she originally produced the work. In this way, 
too, statutory intellectual property may exceed common-law bounds. 117 
Conversely, restitution law can give answers only to a partial set of ques-
tions since it does not address the subject matters of intellectual property; 
in some of those subject matters (for example, general ideas), the public 
should have an entitlement capable of trumping any restitutionary claim. 
In sum, though a right over benefits to create positive incentives ap-
pears to be consistent with traditional patterns of judge-made law, spe-
cific forms of intellectual property depart from those patterns. Whether 
the departures are justified or not is fruit for another article. 118 
G. Restitution and "Natural Law": Implications 
for Noneconomic Policy Debates 
Restitution has a conditional and limited willingness to order payment 
for services rendered. This article has concentrated primarily on the eco-
nomic reasons that may justify a subset of restitutionary rewards. An-
Fair Use, 55 Law & Contemp. Probs. 93 (1992) (arguing that the public deserves special 
latitude to use others' created works as facts). 
115 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 175 (1975). 
116 Restatement of Restitution, supra note 9, at § I ("a person who has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other"). 
117 I argue that common-law notions of connective justice require such connection be-
tween plaintiff and defendant. See Gordon, supra note 5, at 180-96, 204-5, and 238-48. 
118 For a start to that inquiry, see Gordon, supra note I, at 1384-88 (examining the right 
to sue for unexpected uses of one's work). 
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other possibility may be a moral judgment that persons who labor to give 
others benefits deserve some kind of reward for the value their labor 
helps create. 119 It will be useful to explore briefly the implications that 
the preceding discussion has for this topic. 
In the typical natural-law defense of intellectual property, the argument 
may begin with a right to reward for the benefits one's labor has created 
but moves almost immediately to a right of property, putting aside alto-
gether arguments regarding incentives and public welfare. But even if the 
pattern of restitution law surveyed above shows some recognition of a 
prima facie moral right to reward, the ultimate right of recovery seems 
to generate no more than payment for an author's contribution, however 
that may be defined; this is less than a full property right. Further, even 
if one grants a moral starting point for the pattern, its results would seem 
to depend on a peculiar four-step interplay among policies and principles: 
(1) there might be the (arguable) moral argument in favor of having bene-
ficiaries pay those who produce benefits; (2) against this is weighed the 
desire to protect the defendant and the fear of eroding the market system 
and overloading the courts; (3) when exigency is great enough, the need 
to encourage desirable behavior120 reinforces the (arguable) original im-
pulse to reward the deserving; (4) if exigent need is joined with some 
assurance that markets will not be eroded by granting a right of payment 
and some protection for the defendant appears, the incentive and reward 
policies then conjoin to outweigh any remaining concerns with imposing 
burdens on the judiciary and protecting the defendant from nonconsen-
sual obligations. 121 
This article suggests that the active role of the intellectual-property 
defendant may provide him some protection for his autonomy. It also 
suggests that the likelihood that markets will evolve if a duty of payment 
is imposed obviates most concerns with preserving markets and conserv-
ing judicial resources. Once the weight of these two concerns (autonomy 
and systemic costs) is lightened, it is arguable that the postulated moral 
119 Note that the author is not the only person who causes her work to have value; the 
work's value (the "benefit" it yields) also depends on the audience's capacity to appreciate 
and demand it. Even the usually cited source for natural law defenses of property-John 
Locke-did not subscribe to a labor theory of value. See Karen Iversen Vaughn, John 
Locke: Economist and Social Scientist 17-45, 85-90 (1980). 
120 See Restatement of Restitution, supra note 9, at § 112, comment b. 
121 See id. at§§ 112-17; Restatement (Second) of Restitution§ 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
1983) ("benefit conferred through justifiable response to exigency"). At one point the au-
thors of the first Restatement hint that the presence of exigency may even put into place a 
presumption in favor of rewarding volunteers, so long as they are not officious (have some 
good reason for volunteering) and intend to charge for their services. See Restatement of 
Restitution, supra note 9, at § 112, comment b, at 463 ("Exceptional situations"). 
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right to deserve reward may be heavy enough to assert itself even without 
proof of exigency or significant economic need. If this is so, then 
intellectual-property protection that is broader than pure incentive con-
siderations would justify may be consistent with the common-law pat-
terns: many commentators see such mixtures of desert and social-policy 
arguments operating in the law of copyright. 122 It cannot be proven, how-
ever, that the restitutionary right of action is independent of economic 
considerations since, in the typical case involving an intellectual product, 
the autonomy and systemic cost arguments just mentioned will be accom-
panied by a plausible claim that assuring plaintiff a right of action will 
yield desirable incentives. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In general outline, statutory intellectual property's pursuit of benefit 
production is not inconsistent with the common law's pattern of entitle-
ments. Though the common law of tort imposes no duty to generate 
benefits and imposes no liability on those benefited by others' efforts to 
behave reasonably, these patterns are explained by considerations that 
have few negative implications for intellectual property. 
Restitution is an area notoriously governed by "pockets" of rules and 
judges unwilling to generalize. 123 Nevertheless, one can identify the pri-
mary concerns that, in restitution law, militate against a cause of action, 
and these concerns are lessened in the case of intellectual property: legis-
latively defined rights over intangibles are unlikely to displace otherwise-
available market avenues and, if coupled with advance specification and 
demarcation, are unlikely to cause defendants to be harmed by an 
intellectual-product producer's assertion of a right of action. Further, 
legislative specification can help calm the fear of slippery-slope problems 
that (along with restitution's procedural history) may have contributed to 
the atomism of restitution law. 
All of this does not "prove" that intellectual property is consistent with 
the common law. Among other things, the broad scope of the statutory 
122 See Paul Goldstein, 2 Copyright 5, 685-86 (1990), and id. at vol. 1, 8-9; see also 
Gordon, supra note 1, at 1438 (suggesting "that the [copyright) system serves economic 
goals and employs markets to achieve a rough compromise between authors' claims to 
reward and the public's needs" and distinguishing that from the view that "intellectual 
property rights for creators are only justifiable when the public gains something it would 
not otherwise have had"). 
123 This is changing; even English jurisprudence now seems to accept the notion that a 
variety of disparate cases exhibit similar enough themes to constitute a restitution subject 
category. See Lord Goff of Chieveley & Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution, at v (3d 
ed. 1986). 
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exclusive rights and the injunctions permitted under current intellectual-
property statutes may not be justifiable by recourse to the common-law 
pattern. 124 Further, patent proprietors are permitted to sue even persons 
who, without copying, happen to invent something that duplicates the 
patented invention; though this rule potentially is justifiable in terms of 
providing incentives, it has little parallel in the common-law pattern. I 
leave to other fora the questions of whether the use of common-law 
analogy could yield precise components and limitations for intellectual-
property causes of action, 125 whether statutory intellectual-property pat-
terns have good ground for departing. from the restitutionary model, and 
whether other grounds exist for distinguishing between harm and bene-
fit. 126 This article has concerned itself with how some traditional doctrines 
of tort and restitution have dealt with the imposition of rights and duties 
to encourage the production of benefit. The article concludes that, despite 
an apparent asymmetry in its treatment of positive and negative incen-
tives, the common law's relative unwillingness to provide positive incen-
tives would not extend to circumstances such as those faced by producers 
of intellectual products. 
124 In addition, in those cases where a patent suit is premised not on copying but on mere 
duplication, restitutionary principles would not support a cause of action. 
125 See, generally, Gordon, supra note 5, at section Ill (set of minimum constraints). 
126 This article has suggested that the law is not hostile to the pursuit of positive incen-
tives, that it may favor giving such incentives, and that the law may even recognize a 
noneconomic (moral) duty to pay for benefits conferred. But nothing in the preceding 
discussion proves that the law gives equal status to positive and negative incentives or that 
moral duties to pay for benefits received are as strong as moral duties to refrain from doing 
harm. In fact, restitution's reluctance to impose net harm on defendants may suggest that 
judges believe a duty to pay for benefits received is weaker than a duty to refrain from 
harm; see, for example, Gordon, supra note 5, at 205-11. Also outside the immediate scope 
of this article is the constitutional-law literature on the harm/benefit distinction, represented 
most recently by Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1393, 1433-64 (1991). 
